We combine forward investment performance processes and ambiguity averse portfolio selection. We introduce the notion of robust forward criteria which addresses the issues of ambiguity in model specification and in preferences and investment horizon specification. It describes the evolution of time-consistent ambiguity averse preferences.
Introduction
This paper is a contribution to optimal investment as a problem of normative decisions under uncertainty. This topic is central to financial economics and mathematical finance, and the relevant body of research is large and diverse. Within it, the expected utility maximisation (EUM), with its axiomatic foundation going back to von Neumann and Morgenstern [67] and Savage [59] , is probably the most widely used and extensively studied framework. In continuous time optimal portfolio selection it was first explored in Merton [51] . The resulting problem considers maximisation of expected utility of terminal wealth: max
where P is the so-called historical probability measure, T the trading horizon, and U (., T ) the investors utility at T .
Some drawbacks of the classical EUM framework. Despite, however, the popularity of the above model, there has been a considerable amount of criticism on the model fundamentals (P, T, U (., T )), for these inputs might be ambiguous, inflexible and difficult to specify. Firstly, an investor faces a considerable ambiguity as to which market model to use, specifically, how to determine the probability measure P. This is often referred to as the Knightian uncertainty, in reference to the original contribution of Knight [45] . Introduction of ambiguity aversion axiom, motivated by Ellsberg [23] paradox, led to generalised robust EUM paradigm in Gilboa and Schmeidler [29] . It build on earlier contribution, including Anscombe and Aumann [3] and Schmeidler [63] , and has since been followed by a large number of works; we refer the reader to Maccheroni et al. [49] , Schied [61] and to Föllmer, Schied and Weber [28] and the references therein for an overview.
Secondly, the investment horizon T might not be fixed and/or a priori known. Such situations arise, for example, in investment problems with rolling horizons or problems in which the horizon needs to be modified due to inflow of new funds, new market opportunities and new investment options and obligations. One of the issues related to flexible trading horizons is under which model conditions and preference structure one could extend the standard investment problem beyond a pre-specified horizon in a time-consistent manner. This question was recently examined by Källblad [40] . The flexibility of investment horizon is also directly related to utilities that are not biased by the horizon choice. The concept of horizon-unbiased utilities was introduced by Henderson and Hobson [32] ; see also Choulli et al. [12] .
Thirdly, there are various issues with regards to the elucidation, specification and choice of the utility function. Covering all existing works is beyond the scope herein, and for this we only refer to representative lines of research. Firstly, the concept of utility per se might be quite elusive and one should look for different, more pragmatic criteria to use in order to quantify the risk preferences of the investor. We refer the reader to an old note of F. Black [9] where the criterion is the choice of the optimal portfolio, see also He and Huang [30] and Cox, Hobson and Ob lój [13] , and to Sharpe [64] where the criterion is a targeted wealth distribution, see also Monin [52] . Another line of research accepts the utility as an appropriate device to rank outcomes but challenges the classical EUM, for empirical evidence shows that investors feel differently with respect to gains and losses. Among others, see, Hershey and Schoemaker [35] and Kahneman and Tversky [38] . This prompted further ramifications and led to the development of the area of behavioural finance (see, among others, Barberis [5] , Jin and Zhou [37] ). A third line generalises the concept of utility and moves away from a terminal-horizon deterministic utility, as U (., T ) above, by allowing stateand path-dependence. The best known paradigm are the recursive utilities (see, among others, [18, 22, 66] ) which are stochastic processes constructed via a utility-generator. They alleviate several drawbacks of their standard counterparts and have been widely used. State-dependent utilities have been also considered before in static frameworks (see, for example, [17, 42, 43] ). A new family of state-dependent utilities are the so-called forward investment performance processes, recently introduced by Musiela and Zariphopoulou [54, 55] . These are stochastic utilities that are defined for all time horizons and thus alleviate the horizon inflexibility. More importantly, they are flexible enough to incorporate changing market opportunities, investors views, benchmarked performance, stochastically involved risk appetite and risk aversion volatility, and specification of present utility rather than utility in the (possibly remote) future. Their key property is that they are created forward in time. We refer the reader to Musiela and Zariphopoulou [54, 55] for an overview of the topic.
Our motivation and objective. Our work herein was motivated by the above considerations related to the model input triplet (P, T, U (., T )). We propose a framework that addresses simultaneously the above drawbacks and combines elements of the robust and the forward approaches explained above.
Specifically, we consider an investor who invests in a stochastic market in which she does not know the "true" model, nor even if such a true model exists. Instead, she describes the market reality through relative weighting of stochastic models: some are deemed more likely than the others, some are excluded all together, etc. These views are expressed by a penalty function and are updated dynamically with time. The investor's personal judgment of wealth is expressed through her utility function. We adopt the axiomatic approach to normative decisions which implies that, when considering a given investment horizon, say, T , the investor aims to maximise the robust expected utility functional, as in Maccheroni et al. [49] and Schied [61] . We then generalise this criterion by considering a stochastic extension, which is defined for all investment horizons.
In a nutshell, we combine the classical approaches on Knightian uncertainty and robust utility maximisation with forward investment performance criteria. These criteria evolve forward in time in contradistinction with the existing ones, which are pre-specified up to a certain horizon and are generated backwards in a time-consistent manner. The latter property is a fundamental consequence of the Dynamic Programming Principle. However, while time-consistency 1 is a natural property paired with optimality in the existing settings (robust or classical EUM), it needs to be imposed in the forward investment framework. It is in fact the fundamental element in their very definition.
Main contribution. We investigate the pairs of utility fields and penalty functions, which lead to time-consistent optimal behaviour. Such pairs encode forward stochastic preferences and model ambiguity and we call them robust forward criteria, i.e. criteria for assessing in a robust way the investment performance going forward. Our contribution is twofold. First, our theoretical focus is on defining and further characterising the new investment criteria. We consider their duals and establish an appropriate duality result by combining ideas developed in Schied [61] andŽitković [69] . As it is the case in existing works, the study of the dual problem offers various advantages. In particular, in the case of robust preferences the dual problem amounts to the search for an infimum whereas the primal problem features a saddle-point.
Second, we construct a specific example and solve it explicitly. Namely, we consider an investor who starts with a logarithmic utility and applies a quadratic penalty function. Naturally, our solution shows that family of robust forward criteria is non-empty. More importantly, this example offers a theoretical justification and explanation to strategies often pursued by large investors in practice.
Indeed, the investor focuses on building a dynamical estimate of the market price of riskλ and updates her stochastic utility in accordance with the so-perceived elapsed market opportunities. We show that this leads to a time-consistent optimal investment policy given by a (time-consistent) fractional Kelly strategy associated withλ. The leverage is a function of investor's confidence in the estimateλ.
Structure of the paper. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the market model is specified and the notion of robust forward criteria is introduced. In Section 3, equivalent dual characterizations of robust forward criteria are established. While the results hold for very general market models, they require important assumptions on the penalty function. In Section 4, the so called non-volatile robust forward criteria are considered within a Brownian filtration. The discussion is formal as our aim is to illustrate the flexibility of the notion and the fact that interesting preferences might be identified under additional evolutionary requirements. In particular, nonvolatile criteria are linked to a specific PDE which, formally, is discussed in further detail. In Section 5, the example of non-volatile logarithmic criteria mentioned above is studied. Despite its specific form, the explicit solution obtained in this case also illustrates a general fact about robust forward criteria. Namely, that for each robust forward criterion, there exists a specific (standard) forward criterion in the reference market, giving rise to the same optimal behaviour. This is discussed also for more general criteria. Most of the proofs are deferred to appendix.
The market model and definition of the criterion 2.1 The market model and notation
We consider the same market model as set out in Section 2 in [69] and refer thereto for the details. In short, (S 0 ; S) = (S
-dimensional càdlàg semi-martingale on a filtered probability space (Ω, F , F, P), where F = (F t ) t∈[0,∞) satisfies the usual conditions. We let S 0 ≡ 1 and assume S to be locally bounded.
An F-predictable process π = (π t ) t∈[0,∞) is said to be an admissible portfolio if π is S-integrable on [0, T ] for each T > 0 and, furthermore, for any T > 0, there exists a constant a > 0 such that the wealth-process X π given by
is bounded from below by −a for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. The set of all admissible portfolio processes is denoted by A. By A bd we denote the set of all portfolios giving rise to bounded wealth-processes;
For each T > 0, M e T denotes the set of equivalent local martingale measures. That is to say, the set of measures Q on F T such that Q ∼ P| FT and each component of S is a Q-local martingale. Similarly, M a T denotes the set of absolutely continuous local martingale measures. The corresponding sets of density processes are denoted by Z e T and Z a T , respectively:
and similarly for Z a T . We assume that the set M e T is non-empty for each T > 0 which is equivalent to absence of arbitrage (FLVR) on finite horizons (cf. [69] ). Note that
However, there need not exist a set M e of probability measures equivalent to P such that M e T = {Q| FT : Q ∈ M e }, for T > 0.
As argued in [69] , the condition of NFLVR on finite horizons implies that, for each Q ∈ M e T , the density process
, might be extended to a strictly positive martingale (Z t ) t∈[0,∞) such that Z 0 = 1 and ZS is a local martingale. The set of all such processes Z will be denoted by Z e . In particular, NFLVR on finite horizons holds if and only if Z e is non-empty. Furthermore, if the condition of strict positivity is replace by the one of non-negativity, the obtained family is denoted by Z a . For any Q ≪ P, we use the notation
Robust forward performance criteria
Robust forward performance criteria will combine two elements: a utility random field U and a penalty function γ. U (ω, x, t) expresses how the agent feels about having wealth x at time t, given what has happen so far, i.e. for a fixed ω. The agent, who is uncertain about the "true model", forms a view about the relative plausibility of different probability measures to best describe the dynamics of financial assets. This is reflected in γ t,T (Q)(ω) which gives the relative weighting of measure Q on F T . One may expect γ t,T (·)(ω) to have a global minimum which describes agent's estimation of the true model. This will be the case in the example considered in Section 5. In that example, we will also see that the randomness of U (·, x, t) is expressed through the evolution of agent's most likely probability measure.
Both U and γ are combined in making investment decisions. More precisely, to asses an investment strategy the agent considers the expected value of utility U of her future wealth. When comparing expectations under different measures, the agent takes into account their relative weighting specified through γ. This leads to the value function defined in (2) below. Definition 2.1. A random field is a mapping U : Ω × R × [0, ∞) → R which is measurable with respect to the product of the optional σ-algebra on Ω × [0, ∞) and B(R). A utility random field is a random field which satisfies the following conditions: i) For all t ∈ [0, ∞), the mapping x → U (ω, x, t) is P-a.s. a strictly concave and increasing C 1 (R)-function which satisfies the Inada conditions
ii) For all x ∈ R, the mapping t → U (ω, x, t) is càdlàg on [0, ∞);
In what follows, we suppress ω from the notation and simply write U (x, t).
is weakly lower semi-continuous on {Q : Q ∼ P| FT }. Moreover, for a given utility random field U (x, t), we say that (γ t,T ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞, is an admissible family of penalty functions if for all T > 0 and x ∈ R, E Q [U (x, T )] is well defined in R ∪ {∞} for all Q ∈ Q t,T , t ≤ T , where Q t,T denotes the following set of measures on F T :
In the above definition the set of feasible measures Q t,T considered at time t when investing over [t, T ] may depend on t, T but is not random. It is a somewhat arbitrary choice and both larger and smaller sets could be used, e.g. the set of measures Q with γ t,T (Q)(ω) < ∞ or the set of measures Q with E γ t,T (Q) < ∞. However, for many natural penalty functions, the three sets lead to the same value function, see Section 3.2 below. Note also that we did not impose any regularity assumptions on γ t,T (Q) in time variables. These are not necessary for the abstract results in Section 3 and will be introduced later when they appear naturally, see Assumption 2.
Given the above definitions of utility random fields and associated families of penalty functions, robust forward criteria are defined as pairs which are time-consistent: Definition 2.3. Let U be a utility random field and γ an admissible family of penalty functions. Then, the value field associated with U and γ is a family of mappings {u(·; t, T ) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞}, with u(·; t, T ) :
We say that the combination of a utility random field and a family of penalty functions is a robust forward criterion (or self-generating) if
With the assumptions on U and γ, the conditional expectations in (2) are well-defined (extended valued) random variables (see e.g. Prop 18.1.5 in [65] or p. 113 in [31] for the definition of conditional expectations of quasi-integrable random variables). As all Q ∈ Q t,T are equivalent to P, it also holds for each π ∈ A bd that the essential infimum is well-defined (extended-valued) with respect to the reference measure P.
The supremum in the above definition is taken over bounded wealth processes and, for most utility fields, may not be attained. In particular, the definition of robust forward criteria does not require it to be. However, as we now argue, this is natural and not restrictive. Indeed, the utility field defined on the entire real line does not possess any singularities (cf. the non-singularity assumption below). The value field defined with respect to a more general (but feasible) set of admissible strategies would coincide with the one defined with respect to bounded strategies. The above definition would still apply, since the notion of robust forward criteria is a consistency requirement placed on the preferences themselves, without a reference to an optimal strategy. In consequence, for utility fields defined on the entire real line, robust forward criteria defined above may be studied and characterized without exactly specifying the domain of optimization.
Within the present framework where the preferences are finite on the entire real line and in addition to that stochastic, the exact specification of a feasible set of admissible, not necessarily bounded, strategies is highly non-trivial (cf. [60] ). It is therefore convenient to focus on bounded wealth processes. Note that in doing so we follow the approach in [69] rather than the original definition (cf. [54] and [55] ) which required the optimum to be attained 2 . In Section 5 we consider a robust forward criterion of logarithmic type, defined on the positive line only. There, we allow for all non-negative wealth processes and establish existence of an optimizer.
Dual characterizations of robust forward criteria
Dual methods are well known to be useful for the study of optimal investment problems. For the standard utility maximization problem, the aim of introducing and studying the dual problem is to prove existence of and characterize the optimal strategy for the primal problem. Here, the focus is on the evolution of the preferences themselves rather than the optimal strategy. Nevertheless, there are clear benefits in passing to the dual domain: the dual problem amounts to a search for an infimum whereas the primal problem features a saddle-point. In consequence, the robust forward criteria are easier to characterize in the dual rather than the primal domain. The aim of this section is to establish such equivalent characterizations. We adopt a convenient set of assumptions with possible extensions discussed in Remarks 3.4-3.5 below.
We develop duality theory for utility random fields in Definition 2.1 which are defined on the whole real line. The reason is twofold. First, we complement the results in the literature. Our results are related to the ones established in [61] , who considered utilities defined only on the positive halfline. Second, as argued above, considering utilities finite on the entire real line simplifies certain aspects of the duality theory. While analogous results could be pursued for utilities defined on the half-line, it would imply additional technicalities and we leave it for future research (cf. Remark 3.2 in [69] ).
For a given utility random field U , the associated dual random field V :
The dual value field and the notion of self-generation in the dual domain are then naturally defined as follows:
8 Definition 3.1. For y > 0 and 0 ≤ t < T < ∞ the dual value field v(·; t, T ) :
The combination of a dual random field V and a family of penalty functions γ is said to be selfgenerating if V (η, t) = v(η; t, T ), a.s., for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞ and all η ∈ L 0 + (F t ). In order to establish the results in this section, the following technical assumption is needed. Assumption 1. For each T > 0 and t ≤ T , the set Q t,T is convex and weakly compact and the set {ZU
satisfies the non-singularity Assumption 3.3 in [69] .
The above assumption implies that U (x, t) itself satisfies the non-singularity assumption. For further discussion of this concept, we refer to Remark 3.4 in [69] . Given that Q t,T is weakly compact, a sufficient condition for Assumption 1 to hold, is that U (x, t) is (x, ω)-uniformly bounded from below by a deterministic utility function. Then it also trivially holds that any family of penalty functions is admissible. Note also that, due to convexity, weak compactness of Q t,T is equivalent to closedness in L 0 , cf. Lemma 3.2 in [62] .
Next, the first main result, namely the conjugacy relations between the functions u(x; t, T ) and v(y; t, T ) is presented. Note that even for t = 0 Theorem 3.2 differs from Theorem 2.4 in [61] in that the utility function is defined on the entire real line and possibly stochastic. Moreover, we do not impose any finiteness assumptions on the involved value-fields. Theorem 3.2. Let U (x, t), t ≥ 0, be a utility random field, (γ t,T ) an admissible family of penalty functions and V the associated dual random field. Then, under Assumption 1, the primal and dual value fields satisfy the following relations:
u(ξ; t, T ) = ess inf
v(η; t, T ) = ess sup
The proof is given in the Appendix and is based on combining ideas introduced in [61] and [69] , respectively. In the former, duality results for the robust utility maximization problem with variational preferences were established. In the latter, in a setting similar to ours, conditional conjugacy relations were established for the non-robust case. Specifically, by taking expectations, the conditional case is reduced to an F 0 -measurable conjugacy relation. For the latter, equality is proven using arguments similar to the ones in [61] . However, here, the arguments are applied to the nonrobust duality results as formulated by Zitkovic in [69] instead of the duality results in Kramkov and Schachermayer [46] , upon which [61] relies.
The following characterization follows directly from the above result.
Corollary 3.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.2, the combination of a utility random field U and a family of penalty functions γ is self generating if and only if the combination of the dual random field V and the family of penalty functions γ is self-generating.
The above results use the set of measures Q t,T defined in (1) and assumed to be weakly compact. We end this section with some remarks on possible further extensions in the definition and assumptions imposed on Q t,T .
Remark 3.4. Theorem 3.2 can be verified to hold under the assumption that Q a t,T is weakly compact, where Q a t,T is the set of absolutely continuous measures for which the penalty is finite a.s. This holds, in particular, for all penalty functions associated with coherent risk measures continuous from below, see Section 3.2 below. The result then holds with the set Q t,T replaced by Q a t,T in the definition of u(·; t, T ) but with the dual field still defined as above with respect to the equivalent measures. In order to use Q a t,T in the definition of v(·; t, T ) one would need to extend the definition of Z Q V (η/Z Q ) to the null-sets of Q in a suitable way (preserving lower semicontinuity). For the case of utility functions defined on R + , this was done in [61] . The present case requires a more careful treatment which is the focus of future research.
Remark 3.5. In [61] , for the case of positive wealth processes and a fixed time horizon, similar conjugacy relations to (6)- (7) were established without the compactness assumption on Q t,T . The proof exploited instead weak compactness of the level-sets Q(c) := {Q ≪ P : γ 0,T (Q) ≤ c}. Specifically, since U (ε + X T ), X T ≥ 0, is uniformly bounded from below for that case, the infimum in
can be replaced by the infimum over some (weakly compact) level set Q(c), c > 0. After application of a minmax theorem, the result is then obtained by letting ε tend to zero. Since we consider U : R → R, things are more involved. Even for t = 0, U (x, T ) deterministic and π n an optimizing sequence, it is not clear whether E[U (X πn T , T )] is bounded from below. To address such issues one might have to adopt the more elaborate setup considered in [60] where the existence of an optimizer for utility functions defined on the entire real line is proven by defining a sequence of utility functions U n , for each of which the problem is reduced to one defined on the half-line. The result is then obtained by a limiting procedure. We leave these problems for future research.
Further results on robust self-generation
The definition of robust forward criteria requires the combined criterion consisting of U (x, t) and γ(·) to be time-consistent (cf. Definition 2.3). In this section we explore the consequences of further assuming that the family of penalty functions alone are time-consistent. This in fact is rather natural, see Section 3.2.
Assumption 2. For any T > 0 and Q ∼ P on F T , the family of penalty functions (γ t,T ) is càdlàg in t ≤ T , γ t,t ≡ 0 and
We note that the property of stability under pasting (9) in the above assumption is not implied by (8) . For remarks on the relation of the above properties to penalty functions associated with risk measures, see Section 3.2 below.
Time-consistency of the value-field
The additional structure resulting from Assumption 2 allows us to consider the question of whether the value-field itself is self-generating. That is to say, whether the value field associated with a given utility random field U (x, t) and fixed horizon T > 0, satisfies u(x; s, T ) = ess sup π∈A bd ess inf
For the case U (x, T ) = U (x) for some deterministic function U (x), this amounts to the question of whether the value-process of the robust utility-maximization problem (as defined in, among others, [61] ) satisfies the dynamic programming principle. For the non-robust case, this is well-known to be the case (cf. the martingale optimality principle in [19] ). We verify now that under suitable assumptions on the penalty function, this holds also for the robust case. We start with a Lemma in the dual domain.
Lemma 3.6. Let V be a dual random field and γ an admissible family of penalty functions such that either Assumption 2 holds or (8) holds and
and Q ∈Q 0,T , t ≤ T . Moreover, assume that for each t ≤ T , the infimum in (4) is attained for some Q ∈ Q t,T and Z T ∈ Z a T . Then, the dual value field v(·; t, T ) is self-generating on [0, T ]. Remark 3.7. Note that for penalty functions for which Q t,T is weakly compact, existence of a minimizer seems natural. Indeed, as for the case of a fixed measure (cf. [69] ), the dual problem is likely to admit a solution, even though the primal problem may not (due to the restriction to bounded strategies). The fact that the optimizer's second component is in M a T (as opposed to a larger set of finitely additive measures) is due to the utility function being finite on the entire real line; see [69] and also [60] . Without the compactness of Q t,T to obtain existence of a minimiser above, it seems one should extend the setting from equivalent measures and define the dual problem for absolutely continuous measures. Then the compactness of the level-sets could be exploited in order to obtain existence above (cf. Remark 3.5). We leave the above challenges for future research. Proposition 3.8. Let U (x, t) be a utility random field and γ an admissible family of penalty functions. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that for each t ≤ T the infimum in (4) is attained for some Q ∈ Q t,T and Z T ∈ Z a T . Then, for each T > 0, the primal value field u(·; t, T ) is self-generating for t ≤ T .
The definition of standard forward criteria (cf. [54] ) was motivated by the fact that the valueprocess in a standard utility maximization problem satisfies the dynamic programming (martingale optimality) principle. Proposition 3.8 shows that a similar property holds for certain ambiguity averse investment criteria, justifying further our definition of robust forward criteria. We note however that the value-field associated with a general penalty function may not be time-consistent (see [61] for counter-examples). Hence, while standard forward criteria might be viewed as direct extensions of value-functions associated with stochastic utility functions, Definition 2.3 enforces an additional restriction on robust forward criteria. The condition of time-consistency is necessary since the investor's horizon is not a priori known.
Submartingale property of the dual field
We establish in this section a characterization of robust forward criteria in terms of certain "weighted submartingale" property of the dual field. This will be then used to derive an equation which might be used to find examples of robust forward criteria (U, γ). As before, we first establish a Lemma in the dual domain and then deduce consequences for the primal field.
Lemma 3.9. Consider a dual random field V related via (3) to some utility random field and an admissible family of penalty functions (γ t,T ) satisfying (8). Assume, furthermore, that for each η ∈ L 0 + and t ≤ T < ∞ such that v(η; t, T ) < ∞ a.s., the dual value-function (4) attains its infimum for some Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T . Then the following two statements are equivalent. i) V (y, t) and γ are self-generating.
ii) For each y > 0 and for all t ≤ T < ∞,
for all Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T . Moreover, for eachT > 0, there existsQ ∈ Q 0,T andZ ∈ Z a T , such that (11) holds with equality for all t ≤ T ≤T .
for all Q ∈Q 0,T ; then i) and ii) are equivalent to the following condition:
iii) For each y > 0 and for all t ≤ T < ∞, (11) holds for all Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T . Moreover, there exists Z ∈ Z a and a sequence
, for which (11) holds with equality for the choice of Q T and Z T , this for all 0 < t < T < ∞.
A sufficient condition for assumption b) to hold, is that U (x, T ) ∈ L 1 (F T , Q) for all Q ∈Q 0,T , T > 0 (cf. Proposition 3.9 in [69] ) and for the existence assumption see Remark 3.7 above. Finally, Corollary 3.3 and Lemma 3.9 together yield a characterization of time-consistency in the primal domain: Proposition 3.10. Let U (x, t) be a utility random field and γ an admissible family of penalty functions such that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Assume, furthermore, that for each η ∈ L 0 + and t ≤ T < ∞ such that v(η; t, T ) < ∞ a.s., the infimum in (4) is attained for some Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T . Then U (x, t) and γ are self-generating if and only if property iii) of Lemma 3.9 holds.
Penalty functions associated with risk measures
Recall that preferences specification akin to (2) is motivated by results in economics. Axiomatic approach to ambiguity averse choices under uncertainty led to numerical representation in terms of concave utility functionals with the penalty function appearing naturally from the robust representation of convex risk measures, see Gilboa and Schmeidler [29] , Maccheroni et al. [49] and Föllmer, Schied and Weber [28] for an overview. We summarize now some facts about such penalty functions and relate them to our assumptions.
Definition and general remarks
Let ρ t,T be a conditional convex risk measure and γ t,T its associated minimal penalty function (which we assume to be bounded from below), given by γ t,T (Q) := ess sup
for Q ≪ P| FT . Note that it then holds that ρ t,T (X) = ess sup
for X ∈ L ∞ (F T ) (we refer e.g. to [7, 16] for details on conditional risk-measures). Within the context of ambiguity averse portfolio optimization, it is common to restrict to risk-measures ρ t,T which are continuous from below,
s., and, furthermore, that are sensitive in that P (E[ρ t,T (−εA)] > 0) > 0, for all ε > 0 and A ∈ F T such that P(A) > 0. These properties, respectively, render the associated level sets {Q ≪ P : γ 0,T (Q) < c}, c > 0, weakly compact and Q e non-empty (cf. Lemma 4.1 in [61] and Remark 3.5 above).
We note that in (12)
However this is not an issue and we do not have to restrict γ in line with extensions of the risk-measure theory to
, (see [26, 39] and, for the conditional case, [1, 25] ). Here, in analogy to Schied [61] , it is sufficient to impose (weaker) joint integrability conditions on U (x, t) and γ rendering the value function u(·; t, T ) well-defined (cf. Definition 2.2).
A penalty function γ t,T in (12) associated with a risk-measure satisfies properties i) -iii) of Definition 2.2 3 . However, in general, it will not satisfy the weak compactness assumptions used above (cf.
Assumption 1). To illustrate this, note that for this type of penalty functions, it is natural to restrict the set Q t,T in (1) to its subset (cf. e.g. Theorem 1.4 in [2] ):
For a general convex risk measure, this set is not weakly compact. However, as we consider risk measures which are continuous from below, the associated level sets are. In particular, for a coherent risk-measure for which γ ∈ {0, ∞}, it follows that
is weakly compact. If further Q a t,T ⊆ {Q ∼ P| FT }, then the set in (15) is also weakly compact. An example of such a risk measure is considered in [33] (cf. also Theorem 3.16 in [44] ). Naturally, in general Assumption 1 allows for much more flexibility, see also Section 5.
Time-consistent risk measures
For convex risk measures, time-consistency is characterized by the property (8) . Indeed, this property is equivalent (cf. e.g. Theorem 4.5 in [27] ) to ρ, given in (13), satisfying
One would expect this property (combined with Assumption 1) to be sufficient for e.g. Lemma 3.6 to hold. Indeed, assume that U (x, T ) ∈ L ∞ , for x ∈ R. For a fixed strategyπ ∈ A bd , the relation in (10) then reduces to
where φ(X) = −ρ(X) and which, thus, holds true due to (16) . Time-consistency of the valuefunction has also been verified for the choice of specific models and utility functions (see, among others, [33] ). We leave proving our results under this assumption for future research 4 and restrict ourselves to the stronger Assumption 2. Note that any time-consistent coherent risk measure admits where A t,T is the acceptance set defined by A t,T := {Y ∈ L ∞ (F T )|ρ t,T (Y ) ≤ 0}. As argued in the proof of Lemma 2.6 in [27] , the set {E[−ZY |Ft]|Y ∈ A t,T } is directed upwards for any Z ∈ Q t,T . Hence, according to Neveu [58] , for any Z ∈ Q t,T there exists a sequence (Y n ) ∈ A t,T such that γ t,T (Z) = limn→∞ ↑ E[−ZY n |Ft]. By use of monotone convergence we, then, obtain
Conversely, it follows directly from (14) 
and, hence, we have equality.
, is convex and weakly lower semicontinuous as it is the point-wise supremum of a family of affine and weakly continuous functions. 4 Proving that (8) implies (16) (see, e.g., Proposition 1.7 in [8] ) exploits the fact that a conditional risk measure admitting the representation (13) also admits the equivalent representation
where
for any Q ≪ P. Similarly, in order to prove that (8) implies (10), one would need to verify that the set Q t,T (as defined in (15)) in (2) can be replaced by the set of measure satisfying the additional assumption that they equal Q on Ft, for some Q ∼ P; this without affecting the value-function.
the pasting-property (9) (cf. Corollary 1.26 in [2] ). In fact, in our case when all measures in Q t,T are equivalent to the reference measure, even more explicit results hold for these risk measures (for results on the relation between stable sets and time-consistent coherent risk-measures, we refer to [14, 27, 44] ).
Non-volatile robust criteria in a Brownian filtration
In this section we study a specific type of robust forward criteria, characterized by a specific evolutionary property, referred to as non-volatile criteria. This is done within a Brownian filtration and the dual domain. The discussion is formal. Our aim is to illustrate the flexibility of the notion of robust forward criteria and the fact that interesting preferences might be obtained from additional evolutionary requirements. In particular, non-volatile criteria are linked to a specific PDE (cf. equation (33) below) and the difficulties associated with this equation are discussed. An explicit example which results from this discussion is studied in detail in Section 5.
The Brownian setup
We specify further the general setup introduced in Section 2.1. We consider a filtration generated by a two-dimensional P-Brownian motion
, t ≥ 0, and assume that the market consists of a risk-less and risky asset denoted, respectively, by S 0 t and S t , t ≥ 0. Denoting the asset prices in units of S 0 , we have S 0 t ≡ 1 while the dynamics of the risky asset is given by
for some F-progressively measurable processes σ t , σ t = 0 a.s., and λ t , t ≥ 0, where the latter is referred to as the market price of risk.
At this point, we stress that the reference model P is not available to the agent. Rather, she will estimate a model, denoted byP, which she thinks most likely to be the accurate one. We assume thatP ∼ P and denote by (λ t ,η t ), t ≥ 0, the process for which, for all T > 0,
This readily implies that
for someP Brownian motionŴ t , t ≥ 0. Consequently, the agent will consider investment criteria formulated with respect to the modelP. For a given criterion, this can be addressed by a change of the reference measure. However, in order to stress that the estimated measureP might differ from (the unknown) P and illustrate the implications thereof, we keep this explicit notation throughout the section (see further discussion on page 21).
Let P denote the set of all F-progressively measurable processes (ν t ) t≥0 such that T 0 ν 2 t dt < ∞ a.s. for all T > 0. We assume that (λ t ) is in P. Next, let M := ν ∈ P : Z ν t is aP martingale on [0, ∞) , where
We assume that ν t ≡ 0 is in M so that the assumption of NFLVR on finite horizons is satisfied with respect toP (or, equivalently, P). Also note that a density process Z t is in Z e (defined with respect toP) if and only if is of the form Z ν t , for some ν ∈ M. Any measure Q such that Q ∼P on F T , admits a process η t = (η
is a martingale on [0, T ]. We write Q = Q η and assign it a penalty given by
for some function g :
is convex, lower-semicontinuous and satisfies the so called coercivity condition that g t (η) ≥ −a + b|η| 2 for some constants a and b (cf. (8.6) in [28] ). For example, the choice of g t (η) = |η| 2 + ∞1 |η|>g for some constant g > 0, ensures that γ t,T satisfies both Assumptions 1 and 2. 6 We let Q = ∩ T >0 Q 0,T .
Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.9, for a dual random field V (y, t) and a family of penalty functions γ t,T of the type (22) to be self-generating in the dual domain, it is then sufficient that the process
is a P-sub-martingale for all ν ∈ M and η ∈ Q and a martingale for some η * and ν * . Equivalently, it is sufficient to require that for all ν ∈ M and η ∈ Q the process
is a Q η -sub-martingale, with Q η defined via dQ dP | Ft = D η t , and, there exist ν * and η * for which it is a martingale.
Given the assumption of a Brownian filtration, it is natural to assume that the dual value field admits the Itô-decomposition
For future use, we establish:
Lemma 4.1. The process M ην t , t ≥ 0, given in (23) with V (y, t) given in (24), follows the dynamics
where W η t is a Brownian motion with respect to the measure Q defined via
, and wherẽ a is some progressively measurable process and whereb(y, t) is given bỹ
Proof. First, we claim that
is a Brownian motion under the measure Q defined via
Indeed, according to (20) and (21), it holds that
Use of Girsanov yields
and a similar result for the second part of (26) suppressed),
The result follows by rearrangement of terms.
Pinning down of robust forward criteria from the initial condition
In the model-specific (non-robust) case, the robust forward performances are not uniquely specified from the initial condition. This due to the flexibility in the volatility structure 7 . We expect a similar observation to hold in the robust case but subject to specifying the penalty function. We present here a formal discussion of the logarithmic example which motivates our conjecture.
Let V (y, t) be of logarithmic type in that it admits the representation
7 Indeed, for the non-robust case (within a Brownian filtration, cf. [50] and [55] for details), it holds that a random field is a forward criterion if it, for all times t ≥ 0, satisfies the SPDE
equipped with the initial condition U (x, 0) = u 0 (x). Similarly, it can be shown that the value-function corresponding to the standard utility maximization problem (under some regularity conditions) must satisfy the Backward SPDE (27) equipped with the terminal condition U (x, T ) = U (x). A solution to the latter is then a pair of parameter-dependent processes U (x, t) and a(x, t), which satisfy the equation as well as the terminal condition, and which are simultaneously obtained when solving this Backward SPDE. In particular, under some regularity conditions, the solution pair associated with a given terminal condition is unique. The presence of the volatility a(x, t) implies, however, that there might exist multiple stochastic terminal conditions, for all of which the associated solution satisfies U 0 (x) = u 0 (x). Hence, if one allows for stochastic terminal utility functions, there might exist multiple solutions to the inverse investment problem. In particular, there is a oneto-one correspondence between such solutions to the inverse investment problem and admissible volatility processes a(x, t).
for some processes b t and a t which are independent of y. For this choice, V yy (y, t) = 1/y 2 . Hence, formally, it follows from Lemma 4.1 that
At each point in time, say t, the drift-term attains its infimum with respect to ν for the choice of ν t = −η 2 t , for which the ν-dependent term of the drift-term disappears. According to Lemma 3.9, in order for V (y, t) to be self-generating, M ην t must be a sub-martingale for each choice of ν and η and a martingale at optimum. Hence, following (29) , it must hold that
We see, on a formal level, that for a given initial condition and a fixed penalty function g(·), there might still exist multiple robust forward criteria. These may be catalogue by their volatility: the drift is then specified via (30) . In the next two sections we will be interested respectively in the case when volatility is a function of stochastic factors and when it is zero, i.e. in non-volatile criteria.
Fields with volatility in function of stochastic factors
One specific type of criteria are obtained by requiring, within a stochastic factor model, the forward criterion to be a deterministic function of the involved factors. Note that this is an additional assumption as forward criteria, unlike value-functions defined with respect to deterministic utility functions, need not admit such a representation despite the underlying market model being driven by stochastic factors.
For the logarithmic case in Section 4.2, given that µ t and σ t are deterministic functions of some stochastic factor Z t , that amounts to assume that V (y, t) = − ln y + v(Z t , t) for some deterministic function v(z, t). Condition (30) then reduces 8 to a PDE for that deterministic function v(z, t). Naturally, that PDE will be similar to the one obtained for the value-function associated with the ambiguity averse investment problem with a fixed finite horizon and logarithmic terminal utility set within the same market model (cf. Theorem 2.1 in [34] ). However, for the forward case the corresponding equation is equipped with an initial condition and to be solved forward in time for all t ≥ 0. For a general discussion of the issues related to the fact that forward criteria give rise to HJBequations equipped with initial conditions and to be solved on the entire positive line, we refer to 8 Given that the stochastic factor has dynamics given by dZt = j(Zt)dt + dW 2 t it follows from the specific form of V (y, t) that
which substituted into equation (30) yields
[56] where similar standard (non-robust) forward criteria were studied (see also [54, 57] and equation (34) below). Characterisation of initial conditions for which a solution exists is highly non-trivial. On the other hand, given existence for a specific initial condition and penalty function, the solution v(z, t) will be unique under mild conditions. That is, there is a unique way of time-homogeneously propagating the preferences forward under such assumptions.
Non-volatile criteria
Another interesting class of preferences is obtained by requiring the volatility of the dual field in (24) to be zero: a(y, t) ≡ 0. We refer to these criteria as non-volatile. For standard forward criteria, this additional assumption has proven to provide an interesting class of preferences; see [6, 54] .
In order to ease notation, the process b(y, t) is henceforth denoted by V t (y, t). Consequently,
According to Lemma 4.1, the evolution of M ην t , t ≥ 0, is then described by
for some processã t , t ≥ 0. As V (y, t) is convex in its spatial variable, it follows at each point in time t, the drift-term attains its infimum with respect to ν for the choice of ν t = −η 2 t . In particular, the last term of the drift-term disappears for this choice and, thus, it follows from Theorem 3.9 (cf. equation (23) ) that in order to be a forward criterion, the random convex function V (y, t) must solve the equation
Although only formally derived, the above equation might thus be viewed as a type of dual Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. In particular, given existence of a solution to equation (33) , a verification theorem establishing the sufficiency of this condition might also be proven. It would verify that every convex solution to equation (33) constitutes a forward criterion. However, equation (33) is rather hard to handle. The aim in the remainder of this section is to illustrate this and to point out some specific features of this equation.
Equation (33) is a random equation which is satisfied pathwise by the process V (y, t), which is of finite variation. It is a random PDE as opposed to a SPDE due to the restriction to non-volatile criteria. In particular, this implies that for a given initial condition and fixed penalty function for which a solution exists, that solution is unique (under some regularity conditions). Equivalently, for a given penalty function, there is a unique way (if it exists) to propagate the preferences -forwards in time. This is inline with our discussion in Section 4.2 above.
For a fixed path, equation (33) coincides with the one appearing for the case of deterministic utility fields within a log-normal market (cf. the stochastic factor example above with µ and σ constant).
In particular, on any fixed interval [0, T ), it then coincides with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for a (deterministic) value-function within a log-normal model. The underlying model (cf. (18)) is, however, not log-normal and is possibly incomplete. Rather than being an effect of the market model, it is the non-volatility assumption that forces the criterion to be of a very specific stochastic form which, in turn, renders the behaviour path-wise myopic; that is to say, equivalent to that of a log-normal market.
For the particular case of no model-uncertainty, that is to say when g(η) = ∞, η = 0, equation (33) reduces to
This equation characterizes standard (non-robust) non-volatile criteria in the market with market price of risk (λ t ). Such criteria were studied in detail in [6, 54] . As established therein, equation (34) is closely related to the (ill-posed) backward heat equation and, thus, due to Widder's theorem, solutions only exist for a specific class of initial conditions. Similar ill-posed related aspects are present also for the more general equation (33) . In addition to that, equation (33) is also highly non-linear. In order to illustrate this, consider fixing a path and then searching for an optimal η in feed-back form. Since V yy ≥ 0 and g is convex, the expression appearing in (33) is a convex function of η. Hence, if there exists an η * for which the first order condition
is satisfied, then that η * must correspond to a minimum. In particular, if g(η) has a minimum for η = 0, then it holds that η * ∈ [−λ t , 0] (indeed, for η < −λ t it holds that η +λ t < 0 and g ′ (η) < 0, which contradicts (35) . Similarly, for η > 0, it holds that η +λ t > 0 and g ′ (η) > 0). Formally, one could thus solve (35) for η * and then substitute for η * in (33) and then, in turn, solve for V (y, t). The resulting equation for V (y, t) will, however, be highly non-linear as η * depends on V yy . In summary, the difficulties arising from ill-posed related issues as well as non-linearity, renders it hard to analyze equation (33) . In the next section, we consider a specific, particularly interesting, example which we can solve explicitly.
Non-volatile logarithmic criteria -an illustrative example
In this section, we consider non-volatile criteria of logarithmic type. The example is of particular interest as it gives theoretical justification to fractional Kelly strategies often used in practice by large investment funds. More precisely, the agent estimates (dynamically) the market growth (Kelly) strategyX and invests a (dynamically adjusted) fraction of her wealth inX. The leverage, in our framework, has the interpretation of agent's confidence in his estimate ofX. Despite its very specific form, the explicit solution also illustrates two important and general facts about robust forward criteria. Namely, that for each robust forward criterion, there exists a (standard) forward criterion in a specific auxiliary market as well as a specific (standard) forward criterion in the reference market, giving rise to the same optimal behaviour. These properties are further discussed also for more general criteria.
Logarithmic example -main result
We consider the same Brownian framework as set out in the previous section (cf. (18)) and assume that the investor considers forward criteria defined with respect to the estimated modelP. However, here we let (π t ) t≥0 , denote the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset. The associated wealth process follows the dynamics
The set of admissible strategies is here defined as follows:
A := π : (π t ) adapted, (X π t ) well-defined and X π t > 0 a.s. for all t > 0 .
and we also write A x when we want to stress the initial wealth X 0 = x. Finally, we denote by A x t the strategies on in A on [t, ∞) and taking X π t = x. Given the Brownian filtration, a time-consistent penalty function admits representation (22) for some admissible function g t (·). We also consider a slightly more general penalty function
for some adapted, non-negative process (δ t ) which controls the strength of the penalisation. The investor is aware thatP may be an inaccurate estimate of the market (cf. p. 14) and (δ t ) quantifies her trust inP. Note that γ t,T may fail to satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. In particular, Q t,T in (1) may not be weakly compact. This is not a problem since, for this example, we present a direct proof. Finally, we assume that there exists κ > 1/2 such thatÊ exp κ T 0λ 2 s ds < ∞ for all T > 0. This is a convenient integrability assumption which can be interpreted asP being reasonable. Note that it implies in particular, by Novikov's condition, that (Z ν t ) in (20) with ν ≡ 0 is aP-martingale.
Proposition 5.1. Given the investor's choice of (λ t ) and (δ t ) as above, let
and
Recall that the penalty γ is given by (36) and assume thatη ∈ Q 0,T for T > 0. Then, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞,
and the optimum is attained for the saddle point (η,π) as given in (37).
The above result implies that the utility random field U (x, t), given in (38) , and the penalty function γ t,T in (36) constitute a robust forward criterion. For comparison, recall (cf. [54] ) that the random field
constitutes a standard (non-volatile) forward criterion in the reference market P with market price of risk λ t , t ≥ 0. As the criterion (38) is logarithmic as well as non-volatile, the appropriate form of the drift-term could, formally, be obtained by substituting the dual Ansatz V (y, t) = − ln y + t 0 b s ds into either of equations (30) or (33) . However, the proof below is carried out directly in the primal domain. For a comparison with the variational criterion featuring (deterministic) logarithmic utility at some fixed horizon T > 0, we refer to [34] for a stochastic factor model and Theorem 4.5 in [47] for the non-Markovian case.
Proof. Fix 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞. To alleviate the notation, let L t = t 0λ u dŴ u . We have, with 1/p + 1/q = 1 and 1/p + 1/q = 1,
where we tookp < 2κ and p > 1 such thatq
Then, it suffices to show that Eη N t , for all η ∈ Q t,T . For simplicity, and w.l.o.g., we show the claim in the case t = 0. For π ∈ A x , the wealth process satisfies
where W η t is a Brownian motion under Q η . Due to the form of U (x, t) andπ, a straight-forward application of Itô's Lemma yields
Note that δ t /(1 + δ t ) ∈ (0, 1) so by definition of γ t,T in (36), is a submartingale for all η ∈ Q 0,T and a martingale forη as specified in (37) . On the other hand, it holds that
Standard logarithmic utility maximization shows that under Qη, Eη ln X π T ≤ Eη ln Xπ T for any strategy π ∈ A
x . We conclude that
where the equality follows by a direct computation (see also e.g. p. 721 in [41] ).
Remark 5.2. For δ t ≡ δ, the penalty function defined in (36) corresponds to the entropic penalty function γ(Q) = δH(Q|P). For each fixed horizon T the investment problem can then be rewritten in the following way (cf. Remark 4.1 in [28] ),
Consequently, the problem is equivalent to a standard utility maximization problem with respect to the modified utility functionŨ (x, T ) = −e − 1 δ U(x,T ) in the marketP. In this setting it is more natural to consider utility from inter-temporal consumption, cf. [10, 11, 24, 36, 48, 66] . Note, however, that since δ t , t ≥ 0, is non-constant within our setting, this is not the case here.
Fractional Kelly strategies -optimality and interpretation
The investor's optimal behaviour described in Proposition 5.1 is remarkably simple and corresponds to strategies used in practice by some of the large fund mangers. The strategy, characterised by the optimal fraction of wealth to be invested in the risky asset in (37) , is a fractional Kelly strategy. The investor invests in the growth optimal (Kelly) portfolio corresponding to her best estimate of the market price of riskλ. However she is not fully invested but instead has a leverage proportional to her trust in the estimateλ. If δ t ր ∞ (infinite trust in the estimation), thenπ t րλ t /σ t which is the Kelly strategy associated with the most likely modelP. On the other hand, if δ t ց 0 (no trust in the estimation), thenπ t ց 0 and the optimal behaviour is to invest nothing.
We stress thatλ and δ are investor's arbitrary inputs. They might be data driven and come from an elaborate dynamic estimation procedure, be expert driven or simply come from a black box. In particular there is no assumption thatλ is a good estimate of the true market price of risk λ. In fact the latter never appears in the problem. It is crucial that the investor's utility function (38) evolves in function of the investor's perception of market leading to a time-consistent behaviour solving (39) . This seem to capture well the investment practice -in reality an investor never knows the "true" model. Instead, she is likely to build (and keep updating) her best estimate thereof and act on it. This, as shown in Proposition 5.1, can lead to time-consistent optimal investment strategy.
In practice the leverage has often a risk interpretation, e.g. it is adjusted to achieve a targeted level of volatility for the fund. In our framework, it is interpreted in terms of confidence δ in the estimateλ. In practice, the leverage is adjusted rarely in comparison to the dynamic updating of the estimateλ. Similarly, in our framework, the trust in one's estimation methods is likely to be adjusted on a much slower scale than the changes to the estimate itself.
Finally, we note that the optimal strategyπ in (37) can be also interpreted as the Kelly-strategy associated with an auxiliary market with market price of riskλ t given bȳ
That is, the market price of risk that the agent thinks most likely -adjusted by the agent's trust in that estimation. This is closely related to the fact that the existence of the saddle-point (π,η) implies that the optimal investment associated with the robust criterion (36) and (38) coincides with the optimal investment corresponding to a non-volatile standard forward criterion (cf. (40)),
specified in the market with the market-price of riskλ. This is clear from the proof of Proposition 5.1 above.
Existence of equivalent non-robust forward criteria
The existence of criteria in auxiliary markets giving rise to equivalent behaviour can, in fact, be established in far greater generality. Indeed, given the existence of a saddle-point, it follows immediately that the robust forward criterion consisting of the pair U (x, t) in (38) and γ t,T in (22) ranks investment strategies in the same way as does the (non-robust) forward criterion defined viaŨ
considered in the auxiliary market 9 with the market price of risk (λ t ) in (41).
In consequence, if there exists an optimal strategy for a given robust forward criterion, then that strategy is optimal also for a specific standard (non-robust) forward criterion in the reference market. This holds since for any two markets defined with respect to equivalent measuresQ and P, there is a one-to-one correspondence between forward criteria defined in the respective markets (modulo integrability conditions): U (X π t , t) is aQ-(super)martingale if and only if Dη t U (X π t , t) is aP-(super)martingale. The optimal strategies resulting from considering the criteria U (x, t) in thē Q-market and Dη t U (x, t) in theP-market coincide. To summarise, if a robust forward criterion U (x, t) and g t (·) admits a saddle point then the optimal behaviour associated with this criterion is also optimal for the forward criterion (43) considered in the market with market price of risk λ t +η 1 t . Consequently, it is also optimal for the forward criterion
specified in the reference market 10 . This equivalent forward criterion is, of course, defined in terms of the optimalη t , which is part of the solution to the robust problem and not a priori known. Nevertheless, on a more abstract level this implies that viewed as a class of preference criteria, forward criteria can be argued to be 'closed' under the introduction of a certain type of model uncertainty. For a similar conclusion in terms of the use of different numeraires, see Theorem 2.5 in [21] or Section 5.1 in [20] . This should also be compared to [66] , where it was shown that to invest with respect to a given stochastic differential utility combined with a certain model uncertainty is equivalent to considering a modified stochastic differential utility within the reference model (therein, entropic penalty functions were considered but for a Brownian filtration and under some additional boundedness assumptions, the results can be extended also to variational preferences). For stochastic differential utilities as well as for forward criteria, the underlying reason is that the notion is general enough to allow for stochastic preferences. In particular, use of deterministic utility functions under model uncertainty is, under some conditions, equivalent to the use of a specific stochastic utility in a fixed model. A fact which might be used to motivate the use of stochastic utility functions (cf. the use of different numeraires).
It follows that formally, the preferences corresponding to the robust criteria considered here may be embedded embedded within the class of forward criteria. Nevertheless, we believe the example studied in this section illustrates that the notion of robust forward criteria is of great interest. The aim of these criteria and the associated specific modelling of model uncertainty, is to disentangle the impact of the preferences originating from risk and model-ambiguity, respectively. A related and more involved question is under what conditions a given (volatile non-robust) forward criterion can be written as a non-volatile robust forward criterion with respect to some non-trivial penalty times t ≥ 0, a few issues arise. Indeed, for more general penalty-function, it is no longer possible to use t = 0 as a reference point in the way done in (43) , but a criterion of the typẽ
would need to be considered. Hence, in order to avoid the difficulties associated with defining γt,∞(·) we refrain to discuss the relation to non-robust criteria within the Brownian context. 10 For a fixed terminal horizon T > 0, the above argument simply amounts to the fact that, according to Bayes' rule, it holds that ess sup
where, in particular, the supremum on the left and the right hand sides are attained for the same optimal strategy.
function. This question is left for future research. We also remark that the analysis herein and, thus, the above discussion, is restricted to measures equivalent to P. Considering absolutely continuous measures introduces further complexity (cf. [61] for the static case) but should not alter the main conclusions.
Further remarks on the volatility of the equivalent forward criteria
We close this section with some remarks on the volatility of the equivalent criterion specified in (44) . Recall that [53] established (cf. Theorem 4 and the discussion on p. 8 therein) that for any η ∈ T Q 0,T and deterministic solution u : R + × [0, ∞) → R to the equation
it holds that
is a forward criterion in the reference market with market price of risk λ. It follows from our discussion above that, for any solution to (45) , the random field
is a forward criterion in the market with market price of riskλ t (see [54] ). Since u(x, t) = ln x − t/2 is a solution to (45) , the criterion in (42) is of this type for the specific choice ofη. However, as noted above, in general it is not clear whether criteria of the form (46) correspond to robust forward criteria for some non-trivial penalty function.
These remarks illustrate that the assumption of non-volatility of the criterion is market specific. A straightforward calculation yields that the dynamics of the criterion in (46) are given by
Its volatility is given by a(
(λ s + η s ) 2 ds)η t , in particular U satisfies the SPDE (27) for t ≥ 0 with respect to this choice. Hence, while the criterion given in (47) is non-volatile, the corresponding criterion in the reference market is volatile.
Similarly, while the criterion in (38) is non-volatile, the equivalent (non-robust) criterion in the reference market is volatile. Indeed, the non-volatility requirement is placed on the random field associated with the robust criterion. Consequently, while these criteria will be non-volatile in the market specified by the optimal measure (in case a saddle-point exists), they correspond to specific volatile criteria in the reference market. This should be compared to the criterion (40) which is non-volatile in the reference market itself.
A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
The aim of Section A.1 is to prove Theorem 3.2. Note that for t = 0, the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 differ from the assumptions in [61] , however, the results are similar in style. Moreover, given that the conjugacy relations holds for t = 0, the conditional conjugacy relations are expected to hold as well. In order to verify that this is the case, we follow the same procedure as in [69] where a conditional conjugacy relation for the non-robust case was proven. To that end, contrary to the claim, we assume that the conditional conjugacy does not hold (cf. pp. 32). Then, by taking expectations we reduce the problem to a F 0 -measurable conjugacy relation, for which we prove equality by use of arguments similar to the ones used in [61] (Proposition A.4 and Corollary A.5). Hence, we obtain a contradiction and conclude. Auxiliary results and details are worked out below.
Notation and auxiliary results
For the proof of Theorem 3.2, fix two time-points 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞ and a random variable κ ∈ L ∞ + (F t ). We will typically consider κ = 1 1 A , A ∈ F t , and use it to localise arguments to a set. Without further notice, the notation Z t,T ∈ Z a T will be used to denote an element of the set {Z t,T |Z ∈ Z a T }. We also write Z ∈ Q t,T to denote an element of the set {Z Q |Q ∈ Q t,T }. Unless stated otherwise, all the L p -spaces (and their duals), p ∈ [0, ∞], will be with respect to (Ω, F T , P| FT ).
Note that the optimization over K t,T in (2), might be replaced by optimization over C t,T . Then, for Q ∈ Q t,T , introduce the function u
and the function v
For ease of reference, we next present Lemma A.4 from [69] . Note that the proof of this result exploits that the market satisfies NFLVR on finite horizons.
The next result follows by applying Propositions A1 and A3 in [69] to the auxiliary stochastic utility functionŨ (x, T ) in (5). 5) ) satisfies the non-singularity condition 3.3 in [69] . Then, for any ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ),
Proof. As Q ∼ P, Z Q t,T > 0, P-a.s. Moreover, due to assumptionŨ (x, T ), x ∈ R, is integrable and satisfies the non-singularity condition. Proposition A1 in [69] can therefore be applied to the auxiliary random utility function 11Ũ (x, T ), x ∈ R. This yields,
Indeed, on {κ > 0},Ũ (
Moreover, according to Proposition A3 in [69] , their definition of V κ with respect toṼ (y, t) (valid for all ζ * ∈ (L ∞ ) * ) coincides with the definition of V 
That is to say, for every ζ
Hence, it follows from (50) that
, the infimum might equally well be taken over L 1 (F t ) and the result follows.
The next result is this setting's analogue of Lemma 4.6 in [61] . It is proven by use of the same lopsided minimax theorem as is used therein. Together with Lemma A.2, it is the cornerstone of the proof of the duality relation in Proposition A.4 below.
Hence, it is not clear whether the associated random field is actually a utility field in the sense of Definition 2.1 (the field could easily be adjusted in order for the utility and path regularity conditions to hold). However, Proposition A1 in [69] only makes use of the slice U (x, T ) and can, thus, be applied under the given assumptions.
Lemma A.3. Assume that Q t,T is weakly compact and that U (x, t) and γ satisfy Assumption 1. Then,
Proof. For given ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ) and g ∈ C t,T there exists a > 0 such that ξ + g ≥ −a a.s. Hence, U (ξ + g, T ) ≥ U (−a, T ). For a sequence (Z n ) n∈N , Z n ∈ Q t,T , such that Z n → Z a.s., we might thus use Fatou's Lemma to obtain lim inf
As {Z n U − (−a, T )}, Z n ∈ Q t,T , is UI due to Assumption 1, it follows that
and, thus, (52) implies that the function Z → E[κZU (ξ + g, T )] is lower semicontinuous with respect to a.s.-convergence on Q t,T . As Q t,T is convex and weakly compact, it is UI. Hence,
] is lower semicontinuious also with respect to convergence in L 1 . This, in turn, yields weak lower semicontinuity as the function is convex (affine).
According to Definition 2.2, Z → E[κγ t,T (Z)] is also convex and weakly lower semi-continuous on Q t,T , which is convex and weakly compact due to Assumption 1. On the other hand, for each Z ∈ Q t,T , g → E[κZU (ξ + g)] is a concave functional defined on the convex set C t,T . Hence, we might apply the Lopsided minimax theorem (cf. Chapter 6 in [4] ) to obtain the desired result.
Next, we introduce the function u κ :
and the function v κ :
The next result establishes the conjugacy relations between u κ and v κ . This is the key result upon which the proof on the conditional versions in Theorem 3.2 relies.
Proposition A.4. Assume that Q t,T is weakly compact and that U (x, t) and γ satisfy Assumption
Proof. By use of Lemma A.3 we obtain
Note that if
for all x ∈ R. Indeed, due to concavity it holds that
Since P ∈ Q t,T and U (x, T ) ∈ L 1 due to assumption, we might thus, without loss of generality, replace the set Q t,T in (53) by
Due to Assumption 1, we might then apply Proposition A.2 for each Q ∈ Q κ t,T in order to obtain
where it remains to argue the last step. To this end, note that for each ζ
Hence, it follows that Q κ t,T can be replaced by Q t,T without loss of generality. This completes the proof. 
Proof. 12 According to Proposition A.2 (cf. Corollary A.2 in [69] ), it holds that
where Q κ t,T is as defined in (54) . By use of the same arguments as used in the proof of Proposition A.4, it follows that Q κ t,T can be replaced by Q t,T on both sides of the above equation. Hence, it follows that
According to Proposition A.4, uκ is the convex conjugate of vκ. Hence, alternatively, in order to show that vκ is the convex conjugate of uκ, it would be enough to show that vκ is convex and lower semi-continuous.
where the last step follows due to (53) . It remains to justify the interchange of the infimum and supremum in the second step. As in the proof of Lemma A.3, it follows that Z → E[κZU (ξ + g, T )], Z ∈ Q t,T is weakly lower semicontinuous. Hence, so is Q → u Q κ (ξ) as the supremum preserves lower semicontinuity. Moreover, ξ → u Q (ξ)− E[ηξ] is concave. As Q t,T is convex and weakly compact due to assumption and L ∞ is convex, the same Lopsided minimax theorem as in the proof of Theorem A.3 can be applied.
In order to reduce the conditional conjugacy relations to the F 0 -measurable ones proven above, we establish yet an auxiliary result.
Lemma A.6. For fixed g ∈ C t,T and ξ ∈ L ∞ (F T ), it holds that E ess inf
Proof. The inequality '≤' is trivial. To show the reverse inequality, let
Note that P ∈ Q t,T . Moreover, since U (x, T ) ∈ L 1 due to assumption, it holds that
Hence, w.l.o.g. the set Q t,T on the left hand side of the statement in the Lemma can be replaced
Next, we claim that the set J(Q)|Q ∈Q t,T is directed downwards. Indeed, let Q 1 , Q 2 ∈Q t,T and define A := {J(Q 1 ) ≤ J(Q 2 )} ∈ F t . LetQ be the measure defined with respect to
T . According to Lemma 3.3 in [27] ,Q ∈ Q t,T and, furthermore,
In particular, this implies thatQ ∈Q t,T . Consequently, it also follows that J(Q)|Q ∈Q t,T is closed under minimization and so directed downwards. Hence, due to Neveu [58] , there exists a sequence Q n ∈Q t,T such that J(Q n ) is decreasing and ess inf
Use of the monotone convergence theorem then yields E ess inf
Combined with the above and using thatQ t,T ⊆ Q t,T , we obtain E ess inf
and we easily conclude.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof of relation (6) . First, we show that the inequality '≤' holds. To this end, note that for fixed g ∈ C t,T andQ ∈ Q t,T , it trivially holds that ess inf 
Next, for any Q ∈ M a T , S is a local martingale and, thus, so is t 0 π u dS u , for all π ∈ A bd . Since, for all π ∈ A bd , there exists a > 0 such that t 0 π u dS u > −a, t ≤ T , it follows that E Q [g] ≤ 0, for all g ∈ C t,T . Since U (x, T ) ≤ V (y, T ) + xy, for all x ∈ R, y ≥ 0, it, then, in turn, follows that for any Q ∈ Q t,T , Z t,T ∈ Z a T , ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), g ∈ C t,T and η ∈ L for all η ∈ L 1 + (F t ), which completes the proof of the first inequality. To prove the reverse inequality, we argue by contradiction and assume that there exist ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), ε > 0 and A ∈ F t such that ess inf
for all g ∈ K t,T , Z t,T ∈ Z a T , Q ∈ Q t,T and η ∈ L 1 + (F t ). Note tat u(ξ; t, T ) < ∞ a.s. on A and w.l.o.g. we assume that there exists M < ∞ such that u(ξ; t, T ) ≤ M a.s. on A. Next, multiplying the above inequality by κ = 1 1 A , noting that κ = 1/κ on A and taking expectations and using Lemma A.6 we obtain By use of this fact and, moreover, taking the supremum over g ∈ K t,T , we obtain
for all η ∈ L 1 + (F t ) such that η = η1 1 A , Q ∈ Q t,T and ζ * ∈ D for all η ∈ L 1 + (F t ) and Q ∈ Q t,T and, thus, in turn, since u κ (ξ) ≤ M < ∞ (this is why we needed to introduce κ), we obtain u κ (ξ) < u κ (ξ) + εP (A) ≤ inf η∈L 1 (Ft) (v κ (η) + ξ, η ) .
According to Proposition A.4 we have, thus, obtained a contradiction and we easily conclude.
Proof of relation (7). In particular, (6) implies that for all η ∈ L 1 (F t ) and ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), it holds that v(η; t, T ) ≥ u(ξ; t, T ) − ξη. Hence, the inequality "≥" follows directly.
To prove the reverse inequality, we argue by contradiction and assume that there exist η ∈ L 1 + (F t ), ε > 0 and A ∈ F t such that ess inf
for all g ∈ K t,T , ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), Z t,T ∈ Z a T and Q ∈ Q t,T . Since η might be replaced by η1 1 A without violating the above inequality, we assume without loss of generality that η = 0 on A c . Next, multiplying the above inequality by κ = 1 1 A , taking the expectation and using Lemma A.6 yields for all g ∈ K t,T , ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), Q ∈ Q t,T and Z t,T ∈ Z Taking the expectation underQ we then obtain EQ V (yZ t /ZQ t , t) + ǫQ(A) ≤ EQ V (yZ T /ZQ T , T ) + γ 0,T (Q) − γ 0,t (Q).
However, as v(y; 0, T ) = v(y; 0,T ), this contradicts the above (cf. (57)). Hence, we conclude that (11) must hold with equality.
In order to prove that ii) implies i), it suffices to show that for any 0 < t < T < ∞ and η ∈ L 0 + (F t ), it holds that V (η, t) ≤ E Q V ηZ t,T /Z Q t,T , T F t + γ t,T (Q),
for all Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T and that there exists someQ ∈ Q t,T andẐ ∈ Z a T for which equality holds. Note that (11) implies that forη = n k=1 y k 1 1 A k a simple, positive and F t -measurable random variable,
for all Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T . By use of a similar argument to the one used in the proof of Theorem 3.14 in [69] , this can be verified to imply that (59) holds for arbitraryη ∈ L 0 + (F t ). For any Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T , (58) is then obtained by lettingη = ηZ Q t /Z t . Equality in (58) follows by a similar argument where all the inequalities are turned into equalities by the choice of Q T ∈ Q t,T and Z T ∈ Z a T for which (11) holds with equality. Next, we show the equivalence between i) and iii). Given a sequence as specified in iii), ii) trivially holds. Hence, it only remains to show that i) implies iii).
First, we first claim that for each y > 0, there exists Z ∈ Z a and a sequence Q T i , i = 1, ..., such that Q T i = Q T i+1 | F T i and Q T := Q T i | FT ∈ Q 0,T for T ≤ T i . Moreover, for all T > 0, (57) holds forT = T for the choice of Q T and Z T .
To this end, fix two times T 1 and T 2 and let Q 1 ∈ Q T1 and Z 1 ∈ Z a T1 be the optimal arguments at which v(y; 0, T 1 ) is attained. Then, in turn, let Q * ∈ Q T2 and Z * ∈ Z T2 be the optimal arguments at which v yZ 
where it under assumption b) was used that V − (ζ, T 2 ) ∈ L 1 (F T2 ; Q 2 ), for all ζ ∈ L 0 (F T2 ), which (using that v(y; 0, T 1 ) is finite) implies that E Z Q1 γ T1,T2 (Q * ) < ∞ and, thus, that Q 2 ∈ Q 0,T2 .
Under assumption a), the fact that Q 2 ∈ Q 0,T2 follows directly by the fact that Q t,T is stable under pasting. Moreover, Z 2 ∈ Z a T2 . As V (y, t) is self-generating by assumption, v(y; 0, T 1 ) = v(y; 0, T 2 ) and, thus, equality holds in (60) . Consequently, v(y; 0, T 2 ) is attained for the choice of Q 2 and Z 2 .
Use of the same argument as in the proof of i) implies ii), then yields that (57) holds forT = T for the choice of Q T and Z T , for any T ≤ T 2 . Repetition of the above procedure, then gives a sequence satisfying the claim. That the sequence Q Ti , i = 1, ..., and Z ∈ Z a satisfying the claim also satisfies condition iii), follows by use of the same argument as used in the proof of i) implies ii).
